The UK sponsored crop eradication program is an obvious smokescreen. Since October 2001, opium poppy cultivation has skyrocketed.
The presence of occupation forces in Afghanistan did not result in the eradication of poppy cultivation. Quite the opposite.
The Taliban prohibition had indeed caused "the beginning of a heroin shortage in Europe by the end of 2001", as acknowledged by the UNODC.
Heroin is a multibillion dollar business supported by powerful interests. One of the "hidden" objectives of the war was precisely to restore the CIA sponsored drug trade to its historical levels and exert direct control over the drug routes.
Immediately following the October 2001 invasion,
opium markets were restored. Opium prices spiraled.
By early 2002, the opium price (in dollars/kg) was almost 10 times higher than
in 2000.
In 2001, under the Taliban opiate production stood at 185 tons, increasing to
3400 tons in 2002 under the US sponsored puppet regime of President Hamid Karzai.
While highlighting Karzai's patriotic struggle against the Taliban, the media
fails to mention that Karzai collaborated with the Taliban. He had also been on
the payroll of a major US oil company, UNOCAL. In fact, since the mid-1990s,
Hamid Karzai had acted as a consultant and lobbyist for UNOCAL in negotiations
with the Taliban. According to the Saudi newspaper Al-Watan:
"Karzai has been a Central Intelligence Agency covert operator since the 1980s.
He collaborated with the CIA in funneling U.S. aid to the Taliban as of 1994
when the Americans had secretly and through the Pakistanis [specifically the ISI]
supported the Taliban's assumption of power." (quoted in Karen Talbot, U.S.
Energy Giant Unocal Appoints Interim Government in Kabul, Global Outlook, No. 1,
Spring 2002. p. 70. See also BBC Monitoring Service, 15 December 2001)
HISTORY OF THE GOLDEN CRESCENT DRUG TRADE
It is worth recalling the history of the Golden Crescent drug trade, which is
intimately related to the CIA's covert operations in the region since the
onslaught of the Soviet-Afghan war and its aftermath.
Prior to the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989), opium production in Afghanistan and
Pakistan was directed to small regional markets. There was no local production
of heroin. (Alfred McCoy, Drug Fallout: the CIA's Forty Year Complicity in the
Narcotics Trade. The Progressive, 1 August 1997).
The Afghan narcotics economy was a carefully designed project of the CIA
supported by US foreign policy. As revealed in the Iran-Contra and Bank of
Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) scandals, CIA covert operations in
support of the Afghan Mujahideen had been funded through the laundering of drug
money. "Dirty money" was recycled --through a number of banking institutions (in
the Middle East) as well as through anonymous CIA shell companies--, into
"covert money," used to finance various insurgent groups during the
Soviet-Afghan war, and its aftermath:
"Because the US wanted to supply the Mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan with
stinger missiles and other military hardware it needed the full cooperation of
Pakistan. By the mid-1980s, the CIA operation in Islamabad was one of the
largest US intelligence stations in the World. `If BCCI is such an embarrassment
to the US that forthright investigations are not being pursued it has a lot to
do with the blind eye the US turned to the heroin trafficking in Pakistan', said
a US intelligence officer. ("The Dirtiest Bank of All," Time, July 29, 1991, p.
22.)
Researcher Alfred McCoy's study confirms that within two years of the onslaught
of the CIA's covert operation in Afghanistan in 1979,
"the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands became the world's top heroin producer,
supplying 60 per cent of U.S. demand. In Pakistan, the heroin-addict population
went from near zero in 1979 to 1.2 million by 1985, a much steeper rise than in
any other nation."
"CIA assets again controlled this heroin trade. As the Mujahideen guerrillas
seized territory inside Afghanistan, they ordered peasants to plant opium as a
revolutionary tax. Across the border in Pakistan, Afghan leaders and local
syndicates under the protection of Pakistan Intelligence operated hundreds of
heroin laboratories. During this decade of wide-open drug-dealing, the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency in Islamabad failed to instigate major seizures or arrests.
U.S. officials had refused to investigate charges of heroin dealing by its
Afghan allies because U.S. narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been subordinated
to the war against Soviet influence there.
In 1995, the former CIA director of the Afghan operation, Charles Cogan,
admitted the CIA had indeed sacrificed the drug war to fight the Cold War. 'Our
main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets. We didn't
really have the resources or the time to devote to an investigation of the drug
trade,' I don't think that we need to apologize for this. Every situation has
its fallout. There was fallout in terms of drugs, yes. But the main objective
was accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan.'"(McCoy, op cit)
The role of the CIA, which is amply documented, is not mentioned in official
UNODC publications, which focus on internal social and political factors.
Needless to say, the historical roots of the opium trade have been grossly
distorted.
(See UNODC
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/afg_opium_economy_www.pdf
According to the UNODC, Afghanistan’s opium production has increased, more than
15-fold since 1979. In the wake of the Soviet-Afghan war, the growth of
narcotics economy has continued unabated. The Taliban, which were supported by
the US, were initially instrumental in the further growth of opiate production
until the 2000 opium ban.
(See UNODC
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/afg_opium_economy_www.pdf
This recycling of drug money was used to finance the post-Cold War insurgencies
in Central Asia and the Balkans including Al Qaeda. (For details, see Michel
Chossudovsky, War and Globalization, The Truth behind September 11, Global
Outlook, 2002,
http://globalresearch.ca/globaloutlook/truth911.html)
NARCOTICS: SECOND TO OIL AND THE ARMS TRADE
The revenues generated from the CIA sponsored Afghan drug trade are sizeable.
The Afghan trade in opiates constitutes a large share of the worldwide annual
turnover of narcotics, which was estimated by the United Nations to be of the
order of $400-500 billion. (Douglas Keh, Drug Money in a Changing World,
Technical document No. 4, 1998, Vienna UNDCP, p. 4. See also United Nations Drug
Control Program, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1999,
E/INCB/1999/1 United Nations, Vienna 1999, p. 49-51, and Richard Lapper, UN
Fears Growth of Heroin Trade, Financial Times, 24 February 2000). At the time
(1994), the global trade in drugs was of the same order of magnitude as the
global trade in oil.
The IMF estimated global money laundering to be between 590 billion and 1.5
trillion dollars a year, representing 2-5 percent of global GDP. (Asian Banker,
15 August 2003). A large share of global money laundering as estimated by the
IMF is linked to the trade in narcotics.
Based on recent figures (2003), drug trafficking constitutes "the third biggest
global commodity in cash terms after oil and the arms trade." (The Independent,
29 February 2004).
Moreover, the above figures including those on money laundering, confirm that
the bulk of the revenues associated with the global trade in narcotics are not
appropriated by terrorist groups and warlords, as suggested by the UNODC report.
There are powerful business and financial interests behind narcotics. From this
standpoint, geopolitical and military control over the drug routes is as
strategic as oil and oil pipelines.
However, what distinguishes narcotics from legal commodity trade is that
narcotics constitutes a major source of wealth formation not only for organised
crime but also for the US intelligence apparatus, which increasingly constitutes
a powerful actor in the spheres of finance and banking.
In turn, the CIA, which protects the drug trade, has developed complex business
and undercover links to major criminal syndicates involved in the drug trade.
In other words, intelligence agencies and powerful business syndicates allied
with organized crime, are competing for the strategic control over the heroin
routes. The multi-billion dollar revenues of narcotics are deposited in the
Western banking system. Most of the large international banks together with
their affiliates in the offshore banking havens launder large amounts of
narco-dollars.
This trade can only prosper if the main actors involved in narcotics have
"political friends in high places." Legal and illegal undertakings are
increasingly intertwined, the dividing line between "businesspeople" and
criminals is blurred. In turn, the relationship among criminals, politicians and
members of the intelligence establishment has tainted the structures of the
state and the role of its institutions.
Where does the money go? Who benefits from the Afghan opium trade?
This trade is characterized by a complex web of intermediaries. There are
various stages of the drug trade, several interlocked markets, from the
impoverished poppy farmer in Afghanistan to the wholesale and retail heroin
markets in Western countries. In other words, there is a "hierarchy of prices"
for opiates.
This hierarchy of prices is acknowledged by the US administration:
"Afghan heroin sells on the international narcotics market for 100 times the
price farmers get for their opium right out of the field".(US State Department
quoted by the Voice of America (VOA), 27 February 2004).
According to the UNODC, opium in Afghanistan generated in 2003 "an income of one
billion US dollars for farmers and US$ 1.3 billion for traffickers, equivalent
to over half of its national income.”
Consistent with these UNODC estimates, the average price for fresh opium was
$350 a kg. (2002); the 2002 production was 3400 tons. (http://www.poppies.org/news/104267739031389.shtml
).
The UNDOC estimate, based on local farmgate and wholesale prices constitutes,
however, a very small percentage of the total turnover of the multibillion
dollar Afghan drug trade. The UNODC, estimates "the total annual turn-over of
international trade" in Afghan opiates at US$ 30 billion. An examination of the
wholesale and retail prices for heroin in the Western countries suggests,
however, that the total revenues generated, including those at the retail level,
are substantially higher.
WHOLESALE PRICES OF HEROIN IN WESTERN COUNTRIES
It is estimated that one kilo of opium produces approximately 100 grams of
(pure) heroin. The US DEA confirms that "SWA [South West Asia meaning
Afghanistan] heroin in New York City was selling in the late 1990s for $85,000
to $190,000 per kilogram wholesale with a 75 percent purity ratio (National Drug
Intelligence Center, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/648/ny_econ.htm ).
According to the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) "the price of SEA
[South East Asian] heroin ranges from $70,000 to $100,000 per unit (700 grams)
and the purity of SEA heroin ranges from 85 to 90 percent" (ibid). The SEA unit
of 700 gr (85-90 % purity) translates into a wholesale price per kg. for pure
heroin ranging between $115,000 and $163,000.
The DEA figures quoted above, while reflecting the situation in the 1990s, are
broadly consistent with recent British figures. According to a report published
in the Guardian (11 August 2002), the wholesale price of (pure) heroin in London
(UK) was of the order of 50,000 pounds sterling, approximately $80,000 (2002).
RETAIL PRICES US
"The NYPD notes that retail heroin prices are down and purity is relatively
high. Heroin previously sold for about $90 per gram but now sells for $65 to $70
per gram or less. Anecdotal information from the NYPD indicates that purity for
a bag of heroin commonly ranges from 50 to 80 percent but can be as low as 30
percent. Information as of June 2000 indicates that bundles (10 bags) purchased
by Dominican buyers from Dominican sellers in larger quantities (about 150
bundles) sold for as little as $40 each, or $55 each in Central Park. DEA
reports that an ounce of heroin usually sells for $2,500 to $5,000, a gram for
$70 to $95, a bundle for $80 to $90, and a bag for $10. The DMP reports that the
average heroin purity at the street level in 1999 was about 62 percent."
(National Drug Intelligence Center, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/648/ny_econ.htm
).
The NYPD and DEA retail price figures seem consistent. The DEA price of $70-$95,
with a purity of 62 percent translates into $112 to $153 per gram of pure
heroin. The NYPD figures are roughly similar with perhaps lower estimates for
purity.
It should be noted that when heroin is purchased in very small quantities, the
retail price tends to be much higher. In the US, purchase is often by "the bag";
the typical bag according to Rocheleau and Boyum contains 25 milligrams of pure
heroin.
(http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/drugfact/american_users_spend/appc.html
)
A $10 dollar bag in NYC (according to the DEA figure quoted above) would convert
into a price of $400 per gram, each bag containing 0.025gr. of pure heroin. (op
cit). In other words, for very small purchases marketed by street pushers, the
retail margin tends to be significantly higher. In the case of the $10 bag
purchase, it is roughly 3 to 4 times the corresponding retail price per
gram.($112-$153)
UK
In Britain, the retail street price per gram of heroin, according to British
Police sources, "has fallen from £74 in 1997 to £61 [in 2004]." [i.e. from
approximately $133 to $110, based on the 2004 rate of exchange] (Independent, 3
March 2004). In some cities it was as low as £30-40 per gram with a low level of
purity. (AAP News, 3 March 2004). According to Drugscope (http://www.drugscope.org.uk/),
the average price for a gram of heroin in Britain is between £40 and £90 ($72-
$162 per gram) (The report does not mention the purity). The street price of
heroin was £60 per gram in April 2002 according to the National Criminal
Intelligence Service.
THE HIERARCHY OF PRICES
We are dealing with a hierarchy of prices, from the farm gate price in the
producing country, upwards, to the final retail street price. The latter is
often 80-100 times the price paid to the farmer.
In other words, the opiate product transits through several markets from the
producing country to the transshipment country(ies), to the consuming countries.
In the latter, there are wide margins between "the landing price" at the point
of entry, demanded by the drug cartels and the wholesale prices and the retail
street prices, protected by Western organized crime.
THE GLOBAL PROCEEDS OF THE AFGHAN NARCOTICS TRADE
In Afghanistan, the reported production of 3600 tons of opium in 2003 would
allow for the production of approximately 360,000 kg of pure heroin. Gross
revenues accruing to Afghan farmers are roughly estimated by the UNODC to be of
the order of $1 billion, with 1.3 billion accruing to local traffickers.
When sold in Western markets at a heroin wholesale price of the order of
$100,000 a kg (with a 70 percent purity ratio), the global wholesale proceeds
(corresponding to 3600 tons of Afghan opium) would be of the order of 51.4
billion dollars. The latter constitutes a conservative estimate based on the
various figures for wholesale prices in the previous section).
The total proceeds of the Afghan narcotics trade (in terms of total value added)
is estimated using the final heroin retail price. In other words, the retail
value of the trade is ultimately the criterion for measuring the importance of
the drug trade in terms of revenue generation and wealth formation.
A meaningful estimate of the retail value, however, is almost impossible to
ascertain due to the fact that retail prices vary considerably within urban
areas, from one city to another and between consuming countries, not to mention
variations in purity and quality (see above).
The evidence on retail margins, namely the difference between wholesale and
retail values in the consuming countries, nonetheless, suggests that a large
share of the total (money) proceeds of the drug trade are generated at the
retail level.
In other words, a significant portion of the proceeds of the drug trade accrues
to criminal and business syndicates in Western countries involved in the local
wholesale and retail narcotics markets. And the various criminal gangs involved
in retail trade are invariably protected by the "corporate" crime syndicates.
90 percent of heroin consumed in the UK is from Afghanistan. Using the British
retail price figure from UK police sources of $110 a gram (with an assumed 50
percent purity level), the total retail value of the Afghan narcotics trade in
2003 (3600 tons of opium) would be the order of 79.2 billion dollars. The latter
should be considered as a simulation rather than estimate.
Under this assumption (simulation), a billion dollars gross revenue to the
farmers in Afghanistan (2003) would generate global narcotics earnings,
--accruing at various stages and in various markets-- of the order of 79.2
billion dollars. These global proceeds accrue to business syndicates,
intelligence agencies, organized crime, financial institutions, wholesalers,
retailers, etc. involved directly or indirectly in the drug trade.
In turn, the proceeds of this lucrative trade are deposited in Western banks,
which constitute an essential mechanism in the laundering of dirty money.
A very small percentage accrues to farmers and traders in the producing country.
Bear in mind that the net income accruing to Afghan farmers is but a fraction of
the estimated 1 billion dollar amount. The latter does not include payments of
farm inputs, interest on loans to money lenders, political protection, etc. (See
also UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/afg_opium_economy_www.pdf , Vienna,
2003, p. 7-8)
THE SHARE OF AFGHAN HEROIN IN THE GLOBAL DRUG MARKET
Afghanistan produces over 70 percent of the global supply of heroin and heroin
represents a sizeable fraction of the global narcotics market, estimated by the
UN to be of the order of $400-500 billion.
There are no reliable estimates on the distribution of the global narcotics
trade between the main categories: Cocaine, Opium/Heroin, Cannabis, Amphetamine
Type Stimulants (ATS), Other Drugs.
THE LAUNDERING OF DRUG MONEY
The proceeds of the drug trade are deposited in the banking system. Drug money
is laundered in the numerous offshore banking havens in Switzerland, Luxembourg,
the British Channel Islands, the Cayman Islands and some 50 other locations
around the globe.
It is here that the criminal syndicates involved in the drug trade and the
representatives of the world's largest commercial banks interact. Dirty money is
deposited in these offshore havens, which are controlled by the major Western
commercial banks.
The latter have a vested interest in maintaining and sustaining the drug trade.
(For further details, see Michel Chossudovsky, The Crimes of Business and the
Business of Crimes, Covert Action Quarterly, Fall 1996)
Once the money has been laundered, it can be recycled into bona fide investments
not only in real estate, hotels, etc, but also in other areas such as the
services economy and manufacturing. Dirty and covert money is also funneled into
various financial instruments including the trade in derivatives, primary
commodities, stocks, and government bonds.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY
US foreign policy supports the workings of a thriving criminal economy in which
the demarcation between organized capital and organized crime has become
increasingly blurred.
The heroin business is not "filling the coffers of the Taliban" as claimed by US
government and the international community: quite the opposite! The proceeds of
this illegal trade are the source of wealth formation, largely reaped by
powerful business/criminal interests within the Western countries. These
interests are sustained by US foreign policy.
Decision-making in the US State Department, the CIA and the Pentagon is
instrumental in supporting this highly profitable multibillion dollar trade,
third in commodity value after oil and the arms trade.
The Afghan drug economy is "protected".
The heroin trade was part of the war agenda. What this war has achieved is to
restore a compliant narco-State, headed by a US appointed puppet.
The powerful financial interests behind narcotics are supported by the
militarization of the world's major drug triangles (and transshipment routes),
including the Golden Crescent and the Andean region of South America (under the
so-called Andean Initiative).
Table 1
Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan
Year Cultivation in hectares Production (tons)
1994 71,470 3,400
1995 53,759 2,300
1996 56,824 2,200
1997 58,416 2,800
1998 63,674 2,700
1999 90,983 4,600
2000 82,172 3,300
2001 7,606 185
2002 74 000 3400
2003 80 000 3600
Source: UNDCP, Afghanistan, Opium Poppy Survey, 2001, UNOCD, Opium Poppy Survey,
2002.
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afg_opium_survey_2002.pdf
See also Press Release:
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/press_release_2004-03-31_1.html , and 2003
Survey:
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2003.pdf
The URL of this article is:
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO404A.html
Michel Chossudovsky is the author of WAR AND GLOBALIZATION, THE TRUTH BEHIND
SEPTEMBER 11, Global Outlook, 2002,
For details click:
http://globalresearch.ca/globaloutlook/truth911.html
In this timely study, Michel Chossudovsky blows away the smokescreen, put up by
the mainstream media, that 9-11 was an "intelligence failure". Through
meticulous research, the author uncovers a military-intelligence ploy behind the
September 11 attacks, and the cover-up and complicity of key members of the Bush
Administration.
According to Chossudovsky, the so-called "war on terrorism" is a complete
fabrication based on the illusion that one man, Osama bin Laden, outwitted the
$30 billion-a-year American intelligence apparatus.
The "war on terrorism" is a war of conquest. Globalization is the final march to
the "New World Order", dominated by Wall Street and the U.S. military-industrial
complex.
September 11, 2001 was the moment the Bush Administration had been waiting for,
the so-called "useful crisis" which provided a pretext for waging a war without
borders.
The hidden agenda consists in extending the frontiers of the American Empire
right around the world to facilitate complete U.S. corporate control outside the
U.S. and a police state on the inside.
Chossudovsky peels back the layers of rhetoric to reveal a huge hoax — a complex
web of deceit aimed at tricking the American people and the rest of the world
into accepting a military solution which threatens the future of humanity.
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WASHINGTON'S HIDDEN AGENDA: RESTORE THE DRUG TRADE THE
SPOILS OF WAR: AFGHANISTAN'S MULTIBILLION DOLLAR HEROIN TRADE
BY MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY
www.globalresearch.ca 5 April 2004
The URL of this article is:
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO404A.html
The Shocking History Of The CIA
In 1933, Marine Corps Major General Smedley Butler was approached by a wealthy and secretive group of industrialists and bankers to overthrow President FDR and establish a fascist dictatorship in the United States. The plan to install a fascist state by force was exposed when Butler blew the whistle and identified the ringleaders in a testimony given to the U.S. House Committee on Un-American Activities. Senator Prescott Bush went on to help finance Hitler's rise to power and continued business dealings with the Nazi's even after America entered the second World War. At the end of WWII, Operation Paperclip was launched by the OSS to smuggle Nazi war criminals into the United States. The OSS provided the perfect model for the CIA which was established in 1947. The CIA's sudden rise to power gave birth to the Military Industrial Complex. By the end of Eisenhower's presidency in 1961 it had become evident that the Federal Government could no longer control the agency. The CIA had gone rogue.
